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This thesis examines the effects of military service on veterans’ earnings in the civilian 
labor force. This is important as the services allocate large amounts of resources to not 
only ensure readiness for the next mission, but to understand its return on investment and 
how to recruit and retain the force. 
Using data from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 2000–2012 and 
multivariate analysis, this thesis identifies premiums and penalties in the civilian labor 
market associated with active service during conscription and the All-Volunteer Force. 
The analysis controls for educational attainment, occupation, race, periods of service, and 
active service years, and finds a penalty for veterans who have a post high school 
education, who, on average, have earnings that are lower than their observationally 
similar non-veteran counterparts. In addition, veterans in business and finance are 
observed to have a penalty for military service, compared to veterans in other occupations 
who are observed to earn more than non-veteran counterparts. Overall, this thesis finds a 
premium associated with service, as measured by post-service civilian earnings. The 
benefit of service varies across occupations, educational attainment and other factors. 
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A. BACKGROUND  
The United States military services utilize a vast network of resources in order to 
man, train, and equip the force. The return on investment (ROI) for the military is an 
important estimate of the return for the amount it allocates to train individual service 
members in the performance of their duties. This training and occupational experience 
offers benefits for both the military and individual service member not only while on 
active service but, potentially, post-separation in the civilian labor force. Measurement of 
this proposed benefit is no simple task, as researchers continue to develop models and 
analyze criteria to assess the true benefit or disadvantage that active military service has 
on veterans’ transitions into the civilian labor force.  
B. PURPOSE AND BENEFITS 
This research examines veterans who have served in the armed forces and 
determines how this military service affects wage earnings in the civilian labor force. It 
also provides a comprehensive analysis of service comparison during the conscription 
period and today’s All Volunteer Force (AVF).  
The answers to the following primary and secondary research questions address 
the effects of military service and how they relate to earning potential in the civilian labor 
force after completion of active service: 
1. Does prior military service have an effect on earnings potential in the 
civilian labor force? 
2. Do veterans earn more after service completion than observationally 
similar non-veterans? 
This research also provides a more extensive analysis of veterans’ income using a 
more robust data set than previous studies. The robustness of this data set includes more 
than 19 million observations, of which more than 1.6 million are veterans (exceeding 
other research data sets by 90%). It also offers a framework for service members who are 
deciding whether to remain on active duty or to begin “second careers” in the civilian 
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sector. Furthermore, this research can assist potential recruits in making informed 
decisions on whether to serve. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis comprises six chapters. Chapter II reviews current literature on the 
effects of enlisted military service and civilian labor force earnings. Chapter III identifies 
data source, descriptive statistics, and data description used for analysis. Chapter IV 
describes the models used for multivariate statistical analysis. Chapter V presents and 
discusses the results of the multiple regression models that examine the relation between 
military service and civilian labor market earnings. Chapter VI presents conclusions and 
recommendations. 
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 LITERATURE REVIEW II.
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter reviews current literature on the effects of enlisted military service 
on civilian labor force earnings. Research in the field of veterans’ earnings is fairly 
robust; different methods and different data sources are used in determining outcomes, as 
this literature review demonstrates. In addition, the use of different military service 
sample selections and inclusions to wage income may have an impact on findings.  
B. RESEARCH MODELS 
1. Loughran, Martorell, Miller, and Klerman (2011) 
In 2011, Loughran, Martorell, Miller, & Klerman studied whether enlistees 
ultimately have higher labor market earnings than they otherwise would have if they 
decided not to enlist in the military service. The empirical strategy of this article begins 
with the use of data from the Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) and 
represents individuals who applied for military service between 1989 and 2003. Earnings 
data are retrieved from the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) Master Earnings File 
(MEF) and the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) (Loughran et al., 2011). In 
essence, this research is an extension of the empirical model first introduced by Angrist 
(1998) that refines comparisons of enlistees and those who are qualified to enlist but 
chose not to volunteer for military service (Loughran et al., 2011).  
The actual empirical approach is multivariate with the use of panel data and 
education, sex, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) category, race, service, and age 
used as independent variables. Then, the differences in mean earnings are calculated. The 
main finding of this article identifies an 11% premium in income for Army enlistees 
compared to non-enlistees over the long-run (Loughran et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
additional results include that the estimated effect of enlistment on earnings is 22% for 
blacks, 11% for Hispanics, and 5% for whites (Loughran et al., 2011). 
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As previously mentioned, “a long line of empirical research has sought to 
determine whether enlistment during the All-Volunteer era (1973 and later) has a causal 
impact on labor market earnings” (Loughran et al., 2011, p. 2). Loughran et al. (2011) 
identify that prior research indicates a comparison of enlistees and non-enlistees via data 
collected from surveys and compares their labor market earnings, controlling for common 
demographics. The latter’s findings are that enlistees earn more than non-enlistees, as 
identified from the research of Bryant, Samaranayake, and Wilhite (1993); Magnum and 
Ball (1989); Phillips et al. (1992); Andrisani and Daymont (1989); and Stafford (1991) 
(Loughran et al., 2011).  
This research claims that the Angrist (1998) empirical model uses a more 
comprehensive population set that provides a better estimate of the effect of enlisting on 
labor market earnings. This is because the comparison is able to control for similar 
characteristics of qualified individuals who enlist and those who do not enlist. In 
addition, the main differences of this study from previous studies are that this research 
uses a more recent sample set and panel data that provides results for enlistees up to 18 
years following the application process, accounts for additional monetary allowances 
such as housing allowance and bonuses that are a substantial portion of military income, 
composes a more significant range of differences between applicants, and shows how 
enlistment affects not only earnings but also attainment of a college education (Loughran 
et al., 2011). 
This research expands our knowledge of how enlistment affects labor market 
incomes when comparing enlistees and non-enlistees, as in studies prior to Angrist (1998) 
and also the Angrist (1998) model that compares qualified candidates who enlist and 
those who do not enlist. This research also identifies limitations and how over the years 
the models may have changed; as they are echoing the same findings with dated data sets. 
Lastly, this article identifies opportunities for the completion of additional research. 
2. Martorell, Miller, Daugherty, and Borgschulte (2013) 
The research of Martorell, Miller, Daugherty, and Borgschulte (2013) expands on 
the study conducted by Loughran et al. (2011) above by seeking answers to the effects of 
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military service on the civilian labor market and how they differ when determining years 
of service (YOS) and military occupational specialty (MOS). This research uses the same 
empirical model as Loughran et al. (2011) but goes a step further; evaluation takes place 
for YOS and also MOS (Martorell, Miller, Daugherty, & Borgschulte, 2013). Overall 
findings of enlistment on earnings mimic those of Loughran et al. (2011), creating short-
run premiums of 3–4% and a long-run effect of 8%, creating a positive return on 
earnings. When examining YOS, two years of service is associated with a negative return 
on military service; there may be other mitigating factors that cause a selection bias, as 
this is not the completion of a typical enlistment contract (Martorell et al., 2013). Other 
YOS variables indicate a positive trend on earnings that exceeds 20% at YOS 4–12, and 
more than doubles at YOS 16 for individuals who do not separate when compared to non-
veterans’ earnings (Martorell et al., 2013). This study identifies large long-run earnings 
gains for all occupational categories, especially healthcare showing 35% gains for 
veterans when compared to their non-veteran counterparts (Martorell et al., 2013). 
Previous research identifies that controlling for years of service and military 
occupational specialty was not a widely used practice and therefore was required to 
provide a better understanding of veterans’ earnings when compared to non-veterans. 
YOS and MOS are not the only differences: “this research examines how economic 
conditions in the civilian labor market that exist at the time individuals exit active duty 
affect postservice earnings” (Martorell et al., 2013, p. xi). Furthermore, they examine the 
impact of participation in a military-to-civilian transition program. Economic conditions 
upon separation and the transition program evaluation are beyond the scope of this thesis 
and will not be evaluated.  
This paper provides a more in-depth examination of YOS and MOS that is similar 
to this thesis research, as this can provide further comparison of findings between 
research papers. Although the independent variables mirror the work of Loughran et al. 
(2011), they also provide validation that the findings of Martorell et al. (2013) are on 
track and establish justification of previous work. 
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3. Davila and Mora (2012) 
Davila and Mora (2012) research the impact of the catastrophic events of 9/11 
upon earnings of veteran men when compared to the civilian labor market. This study 
also includes the examination of racial groups to determine if the effects on earnings also 
relate to specific race(s). The empirical strategy of this research uses data from the 2000 
decennial census and IPUMS data from 2001–2008. The model is the Oaxaca-type wage 
decomposition method that analyzes the changes in wages of veterans and non-veterans 
before the events of 9/11 and compares this with wages post 9/11 (Davila & Mora, 2012). 
“They first estimate an earnings function solely for nonveterans in each year to obtain 
their structure of wages” (Davila & Mora, 2012, p. 262). “Then, after regression 
estimation, the difference is calculated between actual earnings and predicted earnings, 
which results in the impact of veterans’ earnings on the civilian labor market” (Davila & 
Mora, 2012, p. 262). The main findings indicate that pre 9/11 veterans during this time 
period had an average hourly income of 5.1% less than non-veterans; post 9/11 results 
indicate that this penalty slightly decreased to 3.5%, indicating an improvement to 
veteran’s earnings (Davila & Mora, 2012). This research also indicates that race 
separation provides unbalanced results, as earnings for Hispanics and non-Hispanic 
whites increased post 9/11 while those for other race categories did not (Davila & Mora, 
2012). 
This research is the first of its kind when investigating the effects of 9/11 on U.S. 
veteran males. Other research does not hone in on the specifics of 9/11 when comparing 
U.S. veterans to earnings in the civilian labor market. Note that data from 2001 and later 
is included in other research as in this thesis. This thesis does not interpret results solely 
based on the events of 9/11. Additional research also provides the effects of 9/11 for 
Arab-Americans and individuals of similar ethnic backgrounds as identified in the studies 
of Davila and Mora (2005) and Kaushal, Kaestner, and Reimers (2007), resulting in 
negative civilian labor market outcomes (Davila & Mora, 2012).  
This paper does not claim to be the first to examine earnings results of 9/11 on 
U.S. veterans. The variable set is different and uses additions to the “standard” set of 
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variables, including having a disability, being an immigrant, immigrant’s tenure living in 
the United States, and geographic region (Davila & Mora, 2012).  
Examining the results of 9/11 on veteran labor market outcomes continues to be a 
robust research opportunity. Interestingly enough, this study expands our knowledge by 
providing overall negative results in the short-run for veterans’ earnings when compared 
to non-veterans in the civilian labor market. Previous literature generally indicates a 
premium that results because of military service. This research also identifies that 
differentiation between data sets and also variable selection produce different results for 
similar topics of study. 
4. Hirsch and Mehay (2003) 
Hirsch and Mehay (2003) seek to determine the effect of military service on 
earnings in the civilian labor market. The empirical strategy uses the Matched 
Comparison Group Design (MCGD) with data from Reserve Component Surveys (RCS) 
from 1986 and 1992 that estimates the effect of earnings between active duty reservists 
and reservists without active duty service. “The first method of comparison we employ is 
the use of an age-adjusted mean wage differential, based on mean differences within age 
groups. This effectively matches veterans to all nonveterans of the same age” (Hirsch & 
Mehay, 2003, p. 681). Then, the authors use a logit model that predicts the selection 
sample are likely veterans serving on active duty using age and race variables, a 
methodology called propensity score matching (Hirsch & Mehay, 2003). The findings of 
this research conclude that enlisted reservists serving on active duty statistically earn 3% 
more than non-active duty reservists, officer reservists serving on active duty earn 10% 
more than their counterparts, returns for white reservists on active duty show a small 
penalty, blacks on average enjoy a 5% premium, and Vietnam Veterans earn 1.5% less 
than non-active duty reservists (Hirsch & Mehay, 2003). 
Prior research (as previously identified in this literature review) is the foundation 
of investigating veterans’ earnings and the associated effects on the civilian labor force. 
Each research effort tends to identify incremental changes to models and variable 
selection. The research of Hirsch and Mehay (2003) continues these incremental changes 
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by using alternative sources of information, such as the RCS versus census, Current 
Population Survey (CPS), and National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). In 
addition, this research also differentiates by using a different model, MCDG. 
This research discusses the importance of occupations and how they relate to 
economic theory; this results in identifying the need to control for MOS in follow-on 
studies (Hirsch & Mehay, 2003). In addition, the data set provides the opportunity to 
differentiate between officers and enlisted and, in turn, measure their effects in the 
civilian labor market although the results for this study are conservative, future research 
validates its findings; even though it does not, always adhere to the advice it provides in 
measuring veterans’ effects on the civilian labor market. 
C. SUMMARY 
Martorell et al. (2013) and Loughran et al. (2011) use Angrist’s (1998) research 
model as the foundation for studies of veterans’ earnings and the effects on the civilian 
labor market. This foundation anchors itself on eligible military applicants and provides 
empirical analysis between those who enlist and those who do not enlist from sample data 
sets for years 1985–2010 and 1989–2003, respectively. Comparatively, the results of 
these studies are very similar and determine that enlisting in the military service is 
beneficial, with the exception of individuals who complete fewer than two years of 
service as found in Martorell et al. (2013), which translates to the possibility of sample 
selection bias for these veterans. 
Davila and Mora (2012) focus on the events of 9/11 and compare veterans’ pre 
9/11 earnings to post 9/11 earnings in the United States from 2001–2008 IPUMS census 
data. The Oaxaca-type wage decomposition model differs from previous regression 
models of this literature review and identifies different results that equate to a penalty for 
service pre 9/11. In addition, post 9/11 wages do increase by 5.5% for Hispanics, which 
is the most substantial increase of veterans’ earnings in this sample set.  
Hirsch and Mehay (2003) use yet a different model and data set in determining 
the impact of veterans’ earnings in the civilian labor market. By using RCS from 1986 
and 1992, they are able to differentiate between officer and enlisted personnel along with 
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comparing active duty reservists and reservists without active duty. This data selection 
shows differences from the Angrist (1998) model; they identify similar results, 
suggesting validation of these studies. Lastly, Martorell et al. (2013) and this research 
apply occupation as an independent variable that corresponds with economic theory that 
further validates the findings of this research. 
The economic analysis of this thesis will expand our knowledge of veterans’ 
earnings in the civilian labor force by clearly applying a logical multivariate approach. 
The data set for this research is the most robust of these studies, with more than 19 
million observations, including more than 1.6 million veterans. In addition, this research 
possesses the most up-to-date data available from the Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series (IPUMS) database that includes surveys from the 2000–2012 U.S. Census. 
Furthermore, this thesis goes beyond the “standard” set of independent variables and also 
controls for regions of the U.S., marital status, education level, occupation, and whether a 
citizen is born in the U.S. or naturalized, thus eliminating the possibility of omitted 
variable bias. Lastly, the use of interaction terms provides additional accuracy in the 
estimates of this research. 
The main difference of this thesis begins with the analysis of veterans’ earnings in 
the civilian labor force. This research identifies actual veterans having served in the 
military during specific periods during conscription and the AVF. This research does not 
estimate veterans based upon the Angrist (1998) model and, therefore, alleviates bias of 
individuals who did not serve. In addition, the dependent variable log income wage only 
represents income that veterans earn in the civilian labor market; it does not include the 
basic allowance for housing (BAH), basic allowance for subsistence (BAS), income from 
disabilities, or selective reenlistment bonuses (SRB) that research in the literature review 
identifies as additions to income. Also, this research does not focus only on enlisted 
personnel; the vetstaty variable encompasses all individuals having served in the military, 
creating more accurate findings.  
Furthermore, this study does not ignore attainment of higher education; the 
majority of the literature review focuses on enlisted personnel with a high school 
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education. In addition, examination of five occupations is in concurrence with 
recommendations from Hirsch and Mehay (2003), as only two articles in the literature 
review account for basic economic theory concerning personal selection of occupations. 
This thesis only accounts for veterans serving two years or more and does not examine 
the outcomes of veterans serving fewer than two years, thus eliminating selection bias for 
those who do not complete military service requirements as identified in Martorell et al. 
(2013). Lastly, this study will sort specific periods of service for veterans during 
conscription and the AVF. This provides a comprehensive listing of both periods of 
military service in one thesis. 
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 DATA DESCRIPTION III.
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter identifies data source, descriptive statistics, and data description used 
for this research’s multivariate analysis. 
B. DATA SOURCE 
The data source for this research is the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
(IPUMS) database. This thesis uses a robust data set that contains more than 19 million 
observations, of which more than 1.6 million are veterans observed from the 2000–2012 
United States Census. The criteria for data selection are 18–65 year olds who served in 
the U.S. Armed Forces.  
C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for data set used in this thesis. Table 1 shows 
that the average wage income (incwage) in the data set is $38,631.51. The average age of 
the individuals captured in the data set is 40.5 years old. Veterans (vetstaty) represent 
approximately 9% of the data set.  
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Table 1.   Data Set Descriptive Statistics 
(after Integrated Public Use Microdata Series [IPUMS], 2000–2012) 
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D. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
The variable descriptions below are from the IPUMS census information 
database. The variables are separated by the dependent variable and independent 
variables as described below. 
1. Dependent Variable 
The variable incwage is described as the amount of annual income an individual 
earns from employment. The variable is logged in order to interpret findings as a 
percentage. This variable is the outcome (dependent) variable, analyzed in the 
multivariate analysis chapter. 
2. Independent Variables 
The independent variables are categorized by standard demographics such as age, 
sex, and marital status. Factors that can explain differences in wage income are discussed 
below. 
a. Regions 
Earned income can differ by geographical region. The region categories are 
identified per the Bureau of Labor and Statistics website. These dummy variables include 
newenglandregion, newyorknewjerseyregion, midatlanticregion, southeastregion, 
midwestregion, southwestregion, mountainplainsregion, and westernregion. The largest 
sample population percentage is from the Midwest Region and the lowest is from the 
New England Region, as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Population Distribution (after IPUMS, 2000–2012) 
b. Age 
Earnings from wages are known to vary by age, in a non-linear pattern (Borjas, 
2010). The sample set includes individuals between the ages of 18–65. It also includes 
the variable age squared to identify the non-linear effect of age on wages over time.  
c. Sex (Male) 
Wages vary by gender. Therefore, a male binary variable is defined, where male 
equals “1” for a male, and “0” otherwise. Figure 2 provides a breakdown of the 
percentage of males and females that the sample set represents. 
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Figure 2.  Sex Distribution (after IPUMS, 2000–2012) 
d. Marital Status 
The married and notmarried variables are binary and represent “1” for yes and “0” 
otherwise. For the purpose of this research, the notmarried variable includes individuals 
who are widowed and also divorced. The sample set demonstrates that married 
individuals account for 61% of the sample, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Marital Status Distribution (after IPUMS, 2000–2012) 
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e. Race 
Race comprises dummy variables for white, black, and Hispanic. Whites account 
for 79%, blacks 10%, and Hispanics 11% in the data set, per Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.  Race Distribution (after IPUMS, 2000–2012) 
f. Citizenship Status 
Citizenship status variables are dummy variables composed of UScitizen, 
UScitizennaturalized, and nonUScitizen. Figure 5 shows that U.S. citizens comprise 
87.09% of the population set.  
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Figure 5.  Citizenship Status Distribution (after IPUMS, 2000–2012) 
g. Education 
Educational attainment is divided into five different categories. 
Nohighschooldiploma identifies an individual who did not complete the educational 
requirements to graduate from high school. HighschooldiplomaorGED describes the 
completion of high school or a General Education Diploma (GED). 
Somecollegenodegree describes an individual who completed some college but did not 
complete the requirements to obtain a degree. The bachelorsassociatesdegree describes 
the completion of a bachelor’s or associates degree. Mastersdegreeorabove describes 
completion of a masters or doctoral degree. Educational attainment percentages are 
shown in Figure 6. 
 19 
 
Figure 6.  Educational Attainment Distribution (after IPUMS, 2000–2012) 
h. Occupation 
This thesis selects five occupations to include in its analysis. These variables 
identifying the occupational categories used are binary and are identified by “1” if yes 
and “0” otherwise. Occupation descriptions are per the Bureau of Labor and Statistics 
website. Managementoccupations describes management positions in various occupation 
fields from chief executive officers to emergency management directors. 
Busnsandfinancialoperationsocc describes positions in job fields from buyers and 
purchasing agents to tax preparers. Healthcarepractandtechocc includes chiropractors to 
athletic trainers. The variable salesandrelatedocc identifies occupations that include 
cashiers, travel agents, and telemarketers. The variable protectiveserviceocc accounts for 
professions that include law enforcement, firefighting, and private detectives. Figure 7 
describes the sample set percentages of these occupations. 
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Figure 7.  Occupation Distribution (after IPUMS, 2000–2012) 
i. Veteran Status 
The vetstaty variable is a binary variable that annotates “1” as being a veteran and 
“0” as being a non-veteran. This variable is the thesis’s main focus, with over 1.6 million 
observations and accounting for 8.73% of the sample set, as Figure 8 describes. 
 
Figure 8.  Veteran Status Distribution (after IPUMS, 2000–2012) 
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j. Veteran’s Period of Service 
These variables are binary, identifying if veterans served during this time period 
(designated as “1”) or otherwise (“0”). Vet01ltry identifies veterans serving during the 
time period of 2001 and later, vet95x00y identifies 1995–2000, vet90x95y identifies 
1990–1995, vet80x90y identifies 1980–1990, vet75x80y identifies 1975–1980, vetvietny 
identifies Vietnam Veterans serving 1964–1975, vet55x64y identifies 1955–1964, and 
vetkoreay variable identifies veterans serving 1950–1955. Veteran percentages serving 
during a particular time period are shown in Figure 9. The, vet47x50yidentifies 1947–
1950; the sample set does not have veterans serving during this time period and is 
annotated for time period continuity. Vetwwiiy identifies World War II Veterans serving 
1941–1946 and vetothery identifies veterans who did not identify a time period. These 
last two have percentages less than .09% (102 and 428 total samples, respectively) and 
are not annotated in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.  Veteran’s Period of Service Distribution (after IPUMS, 2000–2012) 
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k. Veteran’s Years of Service 
The vetyrsmore binary variable identifies veterans serving more than two years of 
active service, identifying “1” for yes and “0” otherwise. The data set identifies over 1 
million samples and is 8.57% of the sample set, as shown in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10.  Veteran’s Years of Service Distribution (after IPUMS, 2000–2012) 
l. Weighted Variable 
The perwt variable identifies how many individuals are represented by one 
individual in the IPUMS census data set. It is coded as a six-digit number; the last two 
digits are separated by an implied decimal. 
m. Interaction Terms 
This research will analyze a series of interaction terms in Chapter V. They are a 
combination of variables multiplied together and providing specific results. For example, 
a veteran who served for two or more years will be identified by the variable 
vetstatyvetyrsmore (vetstaty*vetyrsmore). 
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 STATISTICAL MODEL METHODOLOGY IV.
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the use of models for multivariate statistical analysis. This 
thesis uses three models to analyze the effects of military service on veterans’ earnings in 
the civilian labor force. Model 1 has four focal points that are used to measure this effect 
(log income wage) and the following groups (veteran status, educational attainment, 
occupation, and race). Model 1 also uses interaction terms that involve veteran status 
interacted with educational attainment, occupation, and race. Model 2 uses interaction 
terms that involve interaction with veteran status and period of service independent 
variables. Model 3 interacts veteran status with period of service and years of service. 
B. MODEL DESIGN 
This thesis uses the dependent (outcome) variable of log income wage. The 
dependent variable measures income in the civilian labor force. Therefore, this study will 
use a multivariate regression model that predicts (in percentages) the probability that 
being a veteran (with interaction terms) affects income in the civilian labor force. 
C. REGRESSION MODELS 
Model 1 
This model will focus on the overall effect on earnings in the civilian labor force 
for being a veteran. This model also measures the effect on earnings of being a veteran 
when interacted with educational attainment, occupation, and race. The independent 
variables white for race and some college no degree for education, and their respective 
interaction terms, are the excluded group of this model. This model uses the 
aweight=perwt command to estimate sample size to the population and the robust 
command to correct for heteroskedasticity. Below is the regression model equation. 
log income wage = β0 + β1(regions of the U.S.) + β2(age) + β3(age2) + β4(male) + 
β5(married) + β6(black) + β7(hispanic) + β8(citizenship category) + β9(educational 
attainment) + β10(occupations) + β11(veteran status) + β12(veteran status interaction 
terms) 
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a. Interaction Terms 
(1) Veteran Status * No High School Diploma 
(2) Veteran Status * High School Diploma or GED 
(3) Veteran Status * Bachelor or Associate degree 
(4) Veteran Status * Master’s degree or above 
(5) Veteran Status * Black 
(6) Veteran Status * Hispanic 
(7) Veteran Status * Management Occupations 
(8) Veteran Status * Business and Financial Operations Occupations 
(9) Veteran Status * Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations 
(10) Veteran Status * Sales and Related Occupations 
(11) Veteran Status * Protective Services Occupations 
Model 2 
The second model focuses on the effects of earnings for being a veteran when 
interacted with period of service independent variables. These ten variables divide the 
conscription and AVF. In addition, the interaction term for Veteran 1947–1950 does not 
provide results and is kept for continuity purposes. The regression is the same as above 
except for the addition of period of service variables, per the below regression equation 
model. 
log income wage = β0 + β1(regions of the U.S.) + β2(age) + β3(age2) + β4(male) + 
β5(married) + β6(black) + β7(hispanic) + β8(citizenship category) + β9(educational 
attainment) + β10(occupations) + β11(veteran status) + β12(period of service) + 
β13(veteran status interaction terms) 
b. Interaction Terms 
(1) Veteran Status * Veteran 2001 or later  
(2) Veteran Status * Veteran 1995–2000 
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(3) Veteran Status * Veteran 1990–1995 
(4) Veteran Status * Veteran 1980–1990 
(5) Veteran Status * Veteran 1975–1980 
(6) Veteran Status * Vietnam Veteran 
(7) Veteran Status * Veteran 1955–1964 
(8) Veteran Status * Veteran Korea 
(9) Veteran Status * Veteran 1947–1950 
(10) Veteran Status * Veteran World War II 
Model 3 
This last model focuses on the effects of earnings for being a veteran when 
interacted with period of service and years of service independent variables. The overall 
result for being a veteran serving two or more years of active service is documented per 
interaction term (1). The remaining ten variables, as per Model 2, divide the conscription 
and AVF. Also, the interaction term for Veteran 1947–1950 does not provide results and 
is kept for continuity purposes. The regression is the same as above except for the 
addition of years of service variables per the below regression equation model. 
log income wage = β0 + β1(regions of the U.S.) + β2(age) + β3(age2) + β4(male) + 
β5(married) + β6(black) + β7(hispanic) + β8(citizenship category) + β9(educational 
attainment) + β10(occupations) + β11(veteran status) + β12(period of service) + 
β13(years of service) + β14(veteran status interaction terms) 
c. Interaction Terms 
(1) Veteran Status * Veteran Serving 2 or more years active service 
(2) Veteran 2001 or later * Veteran Serving 2 or more years active service 
(3) Veteran 1995–2000 * Veteran Serving 2 or more years active service 
(4) Veteran 1990–1995 * Veteran Serving 2 or more years active service 
(5) Veteran 1980–1990 * Veteran Serving 2 or more years active service 
(6) Veteran 1975–1980 * Veteran Serving 2 or more years active service 
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(7) Vietnam Veteran * Veteran Serving 2 or more years active service 
(8) Veteran 1955–1964 * Veteran Serving 2 or more years active service 
(9) Veteran Korea * Veteran Serving 2 or more years active service 
(10) Veteran 1947–1950 * Veteran Serving 2 or more years active service 
(11) Veteran World War II * Veteran Serving 2 or more years active service 
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 MULTIVARIATE RESULTS V.
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the three multiple regression 
models that examine the relation between military service and civilian labor market 
earnings. This chapter will only display the results of select independent variables that are 
discussed for analysis. The full set of regression results for each model can be found in 
the Appendix. 
B. EDUCATION, RACE, OCCUPATION 
This analysis begins with the analysis of the overall effect of veteran status and its 
interactions with educational attainment, race, and occupation, as identified in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Model 1 Multiple Regression Results 


































Table 2. Model 1 Multiple Regression Results 


































Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model 1 
This model focuses on the overall effect of veteran status on earnings in the 
civilian labor force, along with the interaction of veteran status with educational 
attainment, a set of five occupations, and race. Model 1 identifies that all independent 
variables are statistically significant, with the exception of the hispanic independent 
variable (p-value = 0.263); that variable is statistically significant when interacted with 
veteran status. The overall effect results in a premium of increased earnings by 8.3%. 
The educational attainment variables yield premiums of 15.8% and 6.7% for 
veterans who dropped out of high school and who obtained a high school diploma, 
respectively. Model 1 also shows that having an associates or bachelor’s degree results in 
an income penalty of 4.6% for veterans, along with having a master’s degree or higher of 
4.3%. Additionally, veterans employed in the following occupations earn premiums: 
managers 2.1%, healthcare 9.6%, sales 11.3%, and protective services 5.7%. The only 
occupation that produces a penalty for veterans’ earnings is business and financial 
operations at 7.1%. Lastly, for this model black and Hispanic veterans earn premiums of 
3.3% and 4.8%, respectively. 
The overall long-run results of Model 1 are consistent with Loughran et al. 
(2011), Martorell et al. (2013), and Hirsch and Mehay (2003) (officers only), as these 
results produce a premium between 8–11%. When controlling for race, this model is 
more conservative and consistent with Hirsch and Mehay (2003) than Loughran et al. 
(2011). This is because the research conducted by Loughran et al. (2011) produces a 
premium of 22% for blacks and 11% for Hispanics, whereas Model 1 produces more 
modest results of 3.3% and 4.8%, respectively. Furthermore, this model shows more 
modest results compared to Martorell et al. (2013) with respect to occupations. For 
example, Martorell et al. (2013) find that veterans in the healthcare field will earn 
premiums of 35% more than their counterparts, whereas this model generates estimates 
of 9.6%. 
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C. PERIOD OF SERVICE 
Table 3 displays regression results for the general veteran status independent 
variable and associated independent variables for period of service and interaction terms. 
Table 3.   Model 2 Multiple Regression Results 




























Table 3. Model 2 Multiple Regression Results 




























Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model 2 
Model 2 focuses on the effect of veterans’ earnings in the civilian labor force with 
respect to their period of service. These variables are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The period with the most earnings impact for veterans is the period of military 
service from 2001 and later, with a premium of 11.8%. Furthermore, this model shows 
that the AVF era produces an average earnings premium for veterans of 2.6% in the 
civilian labor market. In reality, this is not significant as this earnings premium interprets 
as being close to zero. The earnings for veterans during conscription produce an average 
penalty of 18%, thus disproving the hypothesis that veterans statistically earn more than 
non-veterans.  
The literature review focuses on the AVF, with Hirsch and Mehay (2003) 
highlighting Vietnam Veterans. The average of the AVF periods of Model 2 produces a 
premium of 2.6% and is inconsistent with the estimates of Loughran et al. (2011), 
Martorell et al. (2013), and Davila and Mora (2012). The only consistencies that present 
themselves are the AVF periods of 2001 and later (11.8%) and 1995–2000 (7.1%), which 
are comparatively similar to the overall results from the research of Loughran et al. 
(2011), Martorell et al. (2013), and Hirsch and Mehay (2003) (officers only). On the 
other hand, this model’s control variable average is consistent with Hirsch and Mehay’s 
(2003) (enlisted only) study (3%) and also with their calculations for Vietnam Veterans 
(negative 1.5%). These results can be interpreted as essentially having a zero effect for 
veterans’ earnings in the civilian labor market. 
D. PERIOD AND YEARS OF SERVICE 
Table 4 displays regression results for the general veteran status independent 




Table 4.   Model 3 Multiple Regression Results 
(after IPUMS, 2000–2012) 
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Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model 3 
This model follows the same regression pattern as Model 2; it focuses on the 
effect of veterans’ earnings in the civilian labor market with the addition of YOS. As 
previously mentioned, the YOS variable controls for active service of two years and 
greater. This model produces three statistically insignificant interaction terms for veteran 
periods 1995–2000, 1975–1980, and WWII Veterans, with p-values of 0.934, 0.643, and 
0.177, respectively. The overall effect of military service on earnings in the civilian labor 
market for veterans is a premium of 3.2%. Surprisingly, Model 3 produces a premium of 
23.1% for veterans serving during 2001 and later for two or more years of active service. 
This large premium is statistically significant at the 5% level. On average, the AVF 
produces a premium of 12%, which proves the hypothesis that veterans do earn more 
than observationally similar non-veterans. The conscription terms result in an average 
penalty of 6.5% for veterans serving two or more years of active service during this 
period, which is almost a third of the penalty as shown in Model 2. 
The one article that discusses YOS is Martorell et al. (2013). Interestingly 
enough, this model has two documented consistencies with this research. The first is that 
the 2001 and later control variable is consistent with the YOS variable that includes YOS 
4–12, which indicates a positive return on veterans’ earnings that exceed 20% (Martorell 
et al., 2013). Second, the overall AVF results of Model 3 are consistent with not only the 
research of Martorell et al. (2013) but also Loughran et al. (2011) and Hirsch and Mehay 
(2003) (officers only). 
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 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS VI.
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents conclusions and recommendations. Using data from IPUMS 
2000–2012, this thesis addressed two questions pertaining to the effects of veterans’ 
earnings in the civilian labor force. 
1. Does prior military service have an effect on earnings potential in the 
civilian labor force? 
2. Do veterans earn more after service completion than observationally 
similar non-veterans? 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This research clearly identifies an impact on veterans’ earnings potential in the 
civilian labor force. The effect varies depending on certain demographics, time period, 
and the amount of time a veteran serves. The overall effect of military service on 
veterans’ earnings in the civilian labor force is 8.3% and mirrors the results of Martorell 
et al. (2013), Loughran et al. (2011), and Hirsch and Mehay (2003), which identify a 
premium of veterans’ earnings between 8% and 11% over the long-run. This research 
also identifies a more modest premium for service members serving two or more years of 
active service at 3.2%, which is also comparable to short-run results. 
Educational attainment is a focal point of this research, as the literature review 
does not entertain the differentiation of educational attainment and focuses mostly on 
enlisted personnel who have a high school education. The results in this study are similar 
to previous research with respect to veterans who have only attained a high school 
education. This research identifies an overall income premium of 6.7% for veterans when 
compared to non-veterans having attained a high school diploma. Not having a high 
school diploma also shows a much higher premium of 15.8%. This makes perfect sense 
as a high school dropout who has never served would, on average, have lower human 
capital and would thus be working for much lower wages than his veteran counterpart. 
Furthermore, attainment of higher educational degrees may be delayed per the 
research conducted by Martorell et al. (2013) and Loughran et al. (2011) for enlisted 
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members because of their service versus attending college after high school. Surprisingly, 
this thesis finds that veterans with an associate’s degree or bachelor’s degree on average 
statistically earn 4.6% less than non-veterans with the same degree. In addition, a veteran 
with a master’s degree or higher also earns less by 4.3%. This may pose challenges for 
recruiting and retention of individuals with this level of education. 
Occupations are also a key area of this research and closely resemble the income 
premiums (8–11%) from the research of Martorell et al. (2013) for healthcare (9.6%) and 
sales occupations (11.3%). This thesis also finds premium returns for management 
occupations (2.1%) and protective services (5.7%). Veterans in business and financial 
operations have a penalty of 5.7%. The latter makes sense considering educational 
attainment, but still poses uncertainty when referring to other occupations that require 
higher learning as well. 
Research from Davila and Mora (2012) identifies an increase in wages for post 
9/11 Hispanics in the short-run. Although this thesis considers the long-run, it also 
concludes that Hispanics and blacks observe premiums of 4.8% and 3.3%, respectively, 
relative to non-veterans of the same race. 
The most notable results for the period of service variables are an average 
premium of 12% for the AVF. This is also similar to the results of previous work as 
stated above. The previous years of the AVF yield penalties with gains post 1980, along 
with penalties for service during the conscription period with the exception of Vietnam 
service with a .08% premium, which interprets to essentially zero. 
The period and years of service variables yield mixed results along with non-
existent statistical significance for the 1995–2000 and 1975–1980 variables of the AVF 
and WWII for the conscription period. The most interesting result for this variable is that 
veterans serving 2001 and later with two or more years of active service have a 23.1% 
premium in earnings over non-veteran counterparts. 
Within the specific categories of this research, the results are very similar when 
comparing veteran earnings to non-veterans in the civilian labor force. In some instances, 
post-service veterans do earn more than their observationally similar civilian 
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counterparts, as the variable for 2001 and later with two or more years of active service 
identifies. This research’s findings are very similar and remain very close in the range of 
8–11% that previous research identifies. In addition, there are variables within this 
research that fall below this threshold, as the interaction term for veterans with a high 
school diploma or GED identifies. Therefore, there is no solid yes or no answer to this 
question. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Opportunities exist in continuing to explore the effects of military service on the 
civilian labor market. Even with the vast amount of data collection that takes place from 
the military and also the civilian sector, there still exists a gap in data collection that can 
provide more accuracy. The Angrist (1998) model uses individuals with the same 
characteristics and differentiates between those who enlist and do not enlist, then 
compares the effects of earnings in the civilian labor force. This model uses data from 
veterans in the U.S. Census and compares the effects of previous military service on 
earnings in the civilian labor force. Although the results are comparatively similar in a 
general sense, it is recommended that DMDC and the Total Force Data Warehouse 
(TFDW) track earnings for veterans (both officer and enlisted) once they are released 
from active duty. 
This thesis also provides the next step for continuous research by the Department 
of Defense regarding recruiting and retention. The majority of previous research uses 
enlisted service members as a focal point because of their overall quantity versus a 
smaller service population for officers. Additional research with specific MOS’s and 
designators will provide a thorough understanding to the services of what is required to 
retain both officers and enlisted, in addition to making service income more attractive 
because of the identified income gains in the civilian labor force post-service. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 5.   Overall Model 1 Regression Results 
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Table 6.   Overall Model 2 Regression Results 
(after IPUMS, 2000–2012) 
 
  




newyorknewjerseyregion 0.0385*** 0.0248*** 0.0247*** 0.0344*** 0.0343*** 0.0344*** 0.0344*** 0.0344*** 0.0344*** 0.0344***
[0.0020] [0.0038] [0.0038] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017]
midatlanticregion -0.0297*** -0.0602*** -0.0592*** -0.0328*** -0.0324*** -0.0325*** -0.0326*** -0.0325*** -0.0325*** -0.0325***
[0.0019] [0.0036] [0.0036] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017]
southeastregion -0.1264*** -0.1241*** -0.1232*** -0.1221*** -0.1219*** -0.1221*** -0.1222*** -0.1221*** -0.1221*** -0.1221***
[0.0017] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015]
midwestregion -0.1092*** -0.0866*** -0.0869*** -0.1040*** -0.1042*** -0.1041*** -0.1041*** -0.1041*** -0.1041*** -0.1041***
[0.0017] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015]
southwestregion -0.0984*** -0.1327*** -0.1318*** -0.1027*** -0.1024*** -0.1026*** -0.1026*** -0.1026*** -0.1026*** -0.1026***
[0.0019] [0.0038] [0.0038] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017]
mountainplainsregion -0.1327*** -0.1475*** -0.1471*** -0.1330*** -0.1328*** -0.1330*** -0.1331*** -0.1330*** -0.1330*** -0.1330***
[0.0021] [0.0041] [0.0041] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019]
westernregion -0.0263*** -0.0503*** -0.0495*** -0.0288*** -0.0285*** -0.0287*** -0.0287*** -0.0287*** -0.0287*** -0.0287***
[0.0018] [0.0034] [0.0034] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016]
age 0.1667*** 0.1553*** 0.1549*** 0.1634*** 0.1632*** 0.1629*** 0.1627*** 0.1628*** 0.1630*** 0.1630***
[0.0002] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
agesquared -0.0018*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
male 0.4554*** 0.5113*** 0.5124*** 0.4714*** 0.4722*** 0.4724*** 0.4724*** 0.4723*** 0.4723*** 0.4723***
[0.0008] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007]
married 0.1232*** 0.0892*** 0.0904*** 0.1167*** 0.1170*** 0.1173*** 0.1175*** 0.1174*** 0.1173*** 0.1173***
[0.0008] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007]
Race/Citizenship
black -0.1018*** -0.0884*** -0.0878*** -0.0960*** -0.0959*** -0.0962*** -0.0962*** -0.0961*** -0.0961*** -0.0961***
[0.0014] [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012]
hispanic -0.0023* -0.0237*** -0.0237*** -0.0028** -0.0028** -0.0028** -0.0028** -0.0028** -0.0028** -0.0028**
[0.0013] [0.0031] [0.0031] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012]
UScitizen 0.1234*** 0.1383*** 0.1394*** 0.1280*** 0.1283*** 0.1283*** 0.1282*** 0.1283*** 0.1283*** 0.1283***
[0.0016] [0.0037] [0.0037] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015]
Uscitizennaturalized 0.1325*** 0.1538*** 0.1547*** 0.1409*** 0.1407*** 0.1406*** 0.1405*** 0.1407*** 0.1408*** 0.1408***
[0.0019] [0.0046] [0.0046] [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018]
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nohighschooldiploma -0.3889*** -0.3839*** -0.3856*** -0.3951*** -0.3954*** -0.3955*** -0.3954*** -0.3954*** -0.3955*** -0.3955***
[0.0017] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015]
highschooldiplomaorGED -0.0881*** -0.0983*** -0.0989*** -0.0930*** -0.0933*** -0.0932*** -0.0932*** -0.0932*** -0.0933*** -0.0933***
[0.0011] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010]
bachelorsassociatesdegree 0.3017*** 0.2697*** 0.2695*** 0.2969*** 0.2971*** 0.2971*** 0.2971*** 0.2971*** 0.2970*** 0.2970***
[0.0010] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009]
mastersdegreeorabove 0.6344*** 0.5513*** 0.5512*** 0.6202*** 0.6206*** 0.6204*** 0.6203*** 0.6204*** 0.6204*** 0.6204***
[0.0013] [0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012]
Occupation
managementoccupations 0.5687*** 0.5248*** 0.5235*** 0.5560*** 0.5552*** 0.5552*** 0.5552*** 0.5552*** 0.5552*** 0.5552***
[0.0011] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010]
busnsandfinancialoperationsocc 0.4501*** 0.3989*** 0.3977*** 0.4363*** 0.4356*** 0.4358*** 0.4358*** 0.4357*** 0.4357*** 0.4357***
[0.0016] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014]
healthcarepractandtechocc 0.4661*** 0.3498*** 0.3489*** 0.4405*** 0.4397*** 0.4398*** 0.4398*** 0.4398*** 0.4398*** 0.4398***
[0.0015] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014]
salesandrelatedocc 0.0275*** 0.0154*** 0.0138*** 0.0210*** 0.0205*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** 0.0206***
[0.0013] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012]
protectiveserviceocc 0.1636*** 0.1112*** 0.1098*** 0.1519*** 0.1504*** 0.1505*** 0.1506*** 0.1508*** 0.1508*** 0.1508***
[0.0023] [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021]
Veteran Status/Period of Service
vetstaty 0.0093*** 0.0184*** 0.0202*** 0.0345*** 0.0330*** 0.0192*** 0.0187*** 0.0159*** 0.0148*** 0.0148***


















Table 6. Overall Model 2 Regression Results 























Constant 6.0301*** 6.2599*** 6.2673*** 6.0949*** 6.0968*** 6.1030*** 6.1064*** 6.1036*** 6.1014*** 6.1015***
[0.0050] [0.0104] [0.0104] [0.0045] [0.0045] [0.0045] [0.0045] [0.0045] [0.0045] [0.0045]
Observations 11,909,939 7,482,048 7,482,048 19,391,987 19,391,987 19,391,987 19,391,987 19,391,987 19,391,987 19,391,987
R-squared 0.33 0.315 0.315 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325
AdjR2 0.33 0.315 0.315 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325 0.325
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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newyorknewjerseyregion 0.0283*** 0.0310*** 0.0248*** 0.0248*** 0.0281*** 0.0281*** 0.0282*** 0.0282*** 0.0282*** 0.0282***
[0.0024] [0.0030] [0.0038] [0.0038] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0024]
midatlanticregion -0.0460*** -0.0390*** -0.0600*** -0.0592*** -0.0444*** -0.0445*** -0.0452*** -0.0450*** -0.0450*** -0.0449***
[0.0023] [0.0029] [0.0036] [0.0036] [0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0023]
southeastregion -0.1166*** -0.1138*** -0.1240*** -0.1234*** -0.1154*** -0.1155*** -0.1161*** -0.1159*** -0.1159*** -0.1158***
[0.0021] [0.0027] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021]
midwestregion -0.0932*** -0.0978*** -0.0867*** -0.0868*** -0.0934*** -0.0935*** -0.0934*** -0.0934*** -0.0935*** -0.0935***
[0.0020] [0.0026] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020]
southwestregion -0.1279*** -0.1263*** -0.1326*** -0.1320*** -0.1270*** -0.1268*** -0.1273*** -0.1272*** -0.1273*** -0.1272***
[0.0023] [0.0030] [0.0038] [0.0038] [0.0024] [0.0023] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0024]
mountainplainsregion -0.1399*** -0.1371*** -0.1475*** -0.1471*** -0.1392*** -0.1391*** -0.1396*** -0.1395*** -0.1395*** -0.1395***
[0.0025] [0.0033] [0.0041] [0.0041] [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0025]
westernregion -0.0315*** -0.0213*** -0.0502*** -0.0497*** -0.0305*** -0.0305*** -0.0309*** -0.0307*** -0.0307*** -0.0307***
[0.0021] [0.0027] [0.0034] [0.0034] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021]
age 0.1622*** 0.1671*** 0.1552*** 0.1549*** 0.1629*** 0.1627*** 0.1620*** 0.1621*** 0.1620*** 0.1622***
[0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003]
agesquared -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0018***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
male 0.4948*** 0.4864*** 0.5123*** 0.5125*** 0.4962*** 0.4965*** 0.4961*** 0.4965*** 0.4966*** 0.4966***
[0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010]
married 0.1022*** 0.1109*** 0.0896*** 0.0902*** 0.1033*** 0.1030*** 0.1032*** 0.1035*** 0.1036*** 0.1035***
[0.0010] [0.0013] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010]
Race/Citizenship
black -0.0995*** -0.1079*** -0.0888*** -0.0883*** -0.0990*** -0.0991*** -0.0995*** -0.0994*** -0.0993*** -0.0993***
[0.0017] [0.0022] [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017]
hispanic -0.0079*** -0.0029 -0.0238*** -0.0239*** -0.0082*** -0.0080*** -0.0081*** -0.0081*** -0.0081*** -0.0081***
[0.0018] [0.0022] [0.0031] [0.0031] [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0018]
UScitizen 0.1276*** 0.1241*** 0.1390*** 0.1395*** 0.1296*** 0.1294*** 0.1288*** 0.1292*** 0.1292*** 0.1293***
[0.0021] [0.0026] [0.0037] [0.0037] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0021]
Uscitizennaturalized 0.1400*** 0.1308*** 0.1538*** 0.1546*** 0.1414*** 0.1409*** 0.1406*** 0.1408*** 0.1408*** 0.1409***
[0.0026] [0.0032] [0.0046] [0.0046] [0.0026] [0.0026] [0.0026] [0.0026] [0.0026] [0.0026]
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nohighschooldiploma -0.3923*** -0.3960*** -0.3843*** -0.3852*** -0.3940*** -0.3938*** -0.3936*** -0.3939*** -0.3938*** -0.3939***
[0.0020] [0.0026] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020]
highschooldiplomaorGED -0.0912*** -0.0883*** -0.0985*** -0.0989*** -0.0924*** -0.0924*** -0.0919*** -0.0921*** -0.0922*** -0.0922***
[0.0013] [0.0016] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013]
bachelorsassociatesdegree 0.2842*** 0.2895*** 0.2698*** 0.2695*** 0.2838*** 0.2840*** 0.2841*** 0.2840*** 0.2840*** 0.2840***
[0.0013] [0.0016] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013]
mastersdegreeorabove 0.5854*** 0.6005*** 0.5512*** 0.5515*** 0.5861*** 0.5862*** 0.5855*** 0.5855*** 0.5856*** 0.5856***
[0.0016] [0.0021] [0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016]
Occupation
managementoccupations 0.5518*** 0.5657*** 0.5240*** 0.5234*** 0.5496*** 0.5495*** 0.5502*** 0.5498*** 0.5498*** 0.5497***
[0.0014] [0.0018] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014]
busnsandfinancialoperationsocc 0.4223*** 0.4336*** 0.3980*** 0.3975*** 0.4201*** 0.4200*** 0.4207*** 0.4204*** 0.4204*** 0.4203***
[0.0020] [0.0025] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020]
healthcarepractandtechocc 0.4036*** 0.4309*** 0.3488*** 0.3485*** 0.4017*** 0.4016*** 0.4024*** 0.4020*** 0.4019*** 0.4019***
[0.0019] [0.0024] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0019]
salesandrelatedocc 0.0269*** 0.0330*** 0.0149*** 0.0140*** 0.0252*** 0.0251*** 0.0257*** 0.0253*** 0.0253*** 0.0253***
[0.0017] [0.0021] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017]
protectiveserviceocc 0.1306*** 0.1355*** 0.1091*** 0.1087*** 0.1284*** 0.1274*** 0.1282*** 0.1279*** 0.1279*** 0.1278***
[0.0030] [0.0037] [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0030]
Veteran Status/Period of Service
vetstaty -0.0173*** -0.0999*** -0.0633*** -0.0821*** -0.0986*** -0.0881*** -0.1549*** -0.1116*** -0.1026*** -0.1030***



















Veteran Status/Years of Service
vetyrsmore 0.4068*** 0.1217*** 0.0871*** 0.1184*** 0.1699*** 0.1601*** 0.2142*** 0.1601*** 0.1502*** 0.1491***
[0.0034] [0.0048] [0.0057] [0.0055] [0.0034] [0.0032] [0.0037] [0.0032] [0.0031] [0.0031]
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Veteran Status/Years of Service




















Constant 6.1159*** 6.0152*** 6.2607*** 6.2664*** 6.1045*** 6.1068*** 6.1201*** 6.1183*** 6.1205*** 6.1173***
[0.0062] [0.0078] [0.0104] [0.0104] [0.0063] [0.0062] [0.0062] [0.0063] [0.0062] [0.0062]
Observations 12,683,778 5,201,730 7,482,048 7,482,048 12,683,778 12,683,778 12,683,778 12,683,778 12,683,778 12,683,778
R-squared 0.32 0.323 0.315 0.315 0.319 0.319 0.319 0.319 0.319 0.319
AdjR2 0.32 0.323 0.315 0.315 0.319 0.319 0.319 0.319 0.319 0.319
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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